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Abstract: An antagonistic positional differential game of two persons is considered. The
dynamics of the system is described by a differential equation with simple motions, and the payoff
functional is integro - terminal. For the case when the terminal function and the Hamiltonian
are piecewise linear, and the dimension of the state space is two, a finite algorithm for the exact
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1. INTRODUCTION
Differential games with simple motions are one of the
simple models of conflict-controlled systems. Dynamics
in such games depends only on the players’ controls.
The solutions of such games, which are of independent
interest, are also used in numerical algorithms for solving
differential games of a general type. Despite the simplicity
of the dynamics, solutions to such games are known only
in special cases, in the general case finding solutions is not
an easy task.
Differential games with simple motions were studied by
many authors, in particular, Petrosjan (1993); Pachter and
Yavin (1986); Ukhobotov (1991); Kamneva and Patsko
(2016). The present paper deals with an antagonistic dif-
ferential game with fixed termination moment. The game
is considered in the context of the positional formalization
developed by Krasovskii and Subbotin (1974, 1988).
In the considered game the payoff functional is given.
The first player minimizes the payoff, and the second
player maximizes it from a given initial point. The both
players use feedback strategies. The value of the game is
an optimal guaranteed result for the both players. The
value function assigns an optimal guaranteed result to each
initial position of the game.
The optimal feedback strategies of the players can be
constructed on the basis of the value function, therefore
methods for finding value functions are important in
differential games.
It is known (see, Subbotin (1991, 1995)) that the value
function is a minimax solution of Hamilton - Jacobi -
Bellman – Isaacs equation corresponding to the considered
differential game. The concept of minimax solution is
 The work is supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research
(project 17-01-00074).
equivalent to the concept of viscosity solution introduced
by Crandall and Lions (1983).
In this paper we present a finite algorithm for constructing
the exact minimax solution for Hamilton - Jacobi equation
corresponding to differential game with simple motions
and an integro – terminal payoff functional for the case
of two-dimensional state space and piecewise linear input
data. Presented results generalize results obtained in [Sub-
botin and Shagalova (1992); Shagalova (1999)].
2. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the following antagonistic positional differen-
tial game on a bounded time interval. The motion of a
controlled system is described by equation
ẋ = u(t) + v(t), t ∈ [0, ϑ], x ∈ Rn,
u(t) ∈ P ⊂ Rn, v(t) ∈ Q ⊂ Rn (1)
Here t is the time, ϑ is the fixed terminal moment of the
game, x is the state vector, u(·) and v(·) are controls of
the first and the second players respectively. The sets P
and Q are compact.
Let (t0, x0) ∈ [0, ϑ]×Rn be an initial position. The integro-
terminal payoff functional is given




where the function σ : Rn → R is assumed to be Lipschitz
continuous, and the function g : P ×Q is continuous. The
first player is trying to minimize the payoff by choosing
his control, while the second player is trying to maximize
the payoff.
We suppose that for the differential game under consider-
ation the following condition is satisfied
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[< s, u+ v > +g(u, v)] = H(s), s ∈ Rn (3)
where < s, f > denotes the inner product of vectors s and
f . The function H(·) defined by equality (3) will be called
the Hamiltonian of differential game (1), (2).
It is proved in Krasovskii and Subbotin (1988) that if the
condition (3) holds, then for any initial position (t0, x0) ∈
[0, ϑ] × Rn, there exists the value ω(t0, x0) of the game.
Thus, there is the value function ω : [0, ϑ] × Rn → R.
However, finding the value function is not an easy task,
for the solution of which there is no universal method. In
the case when the integrand g(·) is identically equal to
zero, that is, the payoff function is terminal, the problem
is substantially simplified. In particular, if one of the
functions H(·) or σ(·) is convex or concave, we can write
explicit formulas for the value function using known Hopf-
Lax formulas (see Hopf (1965); Pshenichyi and Sagaidak
(1970); Bardi and Evans (1984)). Also, in the case of not
necessarily convex or concave piecewise linear H(·) and
σ(·), when the dimension n of state space is equal to two,
and the terminal payoff is positively homogeneous, that is,
the function σ(·) satisfies the condition
σ(λx) = λσ(x), x ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R, λ > 0, (4)
to construct the value function exactly, one can use the fi-
nite algorithm [Subbotin and Shagalova (1992); Shagalova
(1999)]. The aim of this paper is to generalize this algo-
rithm to the case of a nonzero piecewise linear integrand
g(·).
3. THE VALUE FUNCTION AS A MINIMAX
SOLUTION OF THE HAMILTON-JACOBI
EQUATION
This section contains information from [Subbotin (1991,
1995)] and facts that are easy to obtain from this informa-
tion, used below for the development of the algorithm for
constructing the value function of differential game (1)-(3).
The value function ω : [0, ϑ]×Rn → R coincides with the








= 0, t ≤ ϑ, x ∈ ×Rn (5)
ω(ϑ, x) = σ(x), x ∈ Rn. (6)
The minimax solution of problem (5), (6) exists and is
unique.
We further assume that the terminal function σ(·) is
positively homogeneous, that is, it satisfies condition (4).
The Hamiltonian H(·) is defined by equality (3) and, as is
not difficult to see, is not positively homogeneous.












) r = 0,
(s, r) ∈ Rn ×R, (7)
σ(x, y) = σ(x) + y, x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R. (8)
We assume that the limit in (7) exists.
Consider the Cauchy problem for the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation with the Hamiltonian H∗(·) positively homoge-












t ≤ ϑ, (x, y) ∈ Rn ×R
(9)
u(ϑ, x, y) = σ(x, y), x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R. (10)
The following assertion is valid.
Theorem 1. The function ω(t, x) is a minimax solution of
problem (5), (6) if and only if the function u(t, x, y) =
ω(t, x) + y is the minimax solution of problem (9), (10).
Thus, the problem of finding the value function for a dif-
ferential game with an integro-terminal payoff functional
reduces to solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation with a
positively homogeneous Hamiltonian. The dimension of
the state space is increased by one in this case.
If the Hamiltonian H∗(·) satisfies the Lipschitz condition,
then the minimax solution u(t, x, y) satisfies the relation









x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R.(11)
Using relation (11), we can replace problem (9), (10) with
the reduced problem of finding the function
ϕ(x, y) = u(0, x, y) x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R. (12)

















· y − ϕ(x, y) = 0, x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R,
(13)










= σ(x, y), x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R. (14)
The minimax solution of (13) is the continuous function
satisfying the pair of differential inequalities. These in-
equalities can be written in different equivalent forms. It is
convenient for us to write these inequalities in the following
form.
H∗(l,m)+ < l, x > +m · y ≤ ϕ(x, y),
x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R, (l,m) ∈ D−ϕ(x, y), (15)
H∗(l,m)+ < l, x > +m · y ≥ ϕ(x, y),
x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R, (l,m) ∈ D+ϕ(x, y), (16)
where the sets D−ϕ(x, y) and D+ϕ(x, y) are respectively
the subdifferential and the superdifferential of function
ϕ(·) at the point (x, y).
4. THE ALGORITHM FOR THE EXACT
CONSTRUCTION OF THE VALUE FUNCTION
In the case when the dimension of the state space is two,
and the terminal function σ(·) and the integrand g(·) are
piecewise linear, the value function ω(·) of differential
game(1)-(3) is piecewise linear and can be constructed
exactly. Here we describe the algorithm for constructing
the function ϕ(·), knowing which, it is possible to receive
function ω(·) by means of relation (11) and Theorem 1.
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4.1 Representation of the Limit Function
Let
y+ = max{0; y}, y− = min{0; y}
σ+(x) = max{0;σ(x)}, σ−(x) = min{0;σ(x)},
σ+(x, y) = σ+(x) + y+, σ

−(x, y) = σ−(x) + y−,
where y ∈ R, x ∈ Rn.
It is not difficult to see that limit function σ(·) (8) can be
presented in the form
σ(x, y) = σ+(x, y) + σ

−(x, y), x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R. (17)
Moreover, the following representation holds for the solu-
tion ϕ(·) of problem (13), (14)
ϕ(x, y) = ϕ+(x, y) + ϕ−(x, y), x ∈ Rn, y ∈ R, (18)
where ϕ+(·) and ϕ−(·) are solutions of the problem (13),
(14) corresponding to the limit functions σ+(·) and σ

−(·)
respectively. Under assumptions described below, the con-
struction of functions ϕ+(·) and ϕ−(·) does not differ in
essence.
4.2 Assumptions
The algorithm is developed under the following assump-
tions.
A1. The integrand g(·) has the form
g(u, v) = g1(u) + g2(v), u ∈ R2, v ∈ R2, (19)
where g1 : R
2 → R and g1 : R2 → R are continuous
piecewise linear functions that are formed by “sewing
together” a finite number of linear functions. So, their sum
g(·) is a continuous piecewise-linear function too.
A2. Sets P and Q are polyhedrons.
It follows from (3) that the HamiltonianH(·) of differential
game (1)-(3) is also piecewise linear and is formed by
“sewing together” a finite number of linear functions.
Hi(s) =< hi, s > +pi, i ∈ 1, nH ,
hi ∈ R2, pi ∈ R, s ∈ R2. (20)
A3. Function σ(·) is positively homogeneous (satisfies
condition (4)) and piecewise linear, that is, it is formed
by gluing together a finite set of linear functions
σi(x) =< si, x >, i ∈ 1, nσ, si ∈ R2, x ∈ R2.
Denote
Z = {si|i ∈ 1, nσ}. (21)
Moreover, by virtue of representations (17), (18), without
loss of generality we can assume that the function σ(·) is
nonnegative
σ(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ R2, (22)
and consider the algorithm for constructing the function
ϕ(·), corresponding to the limit function
σ(x, y) = σ(x) + y+, x ∈ R2, y ∈ R. (23)
4.3 Simple piecewise linear functions
In Subbotin and Shagalova (1992); Shagalova (1999) the
concept of simple piecewise linear functions (SPLF) was
used. Here this concept will also be useful. The main
property of an SPLF is the following. If ψ(·) is an SPLF,
then for an arbitrary point x∗ ∈ R2 in its domain, there
is a neighbourhood Oε(x∗) where ψ(·) has one of three
possible representations:
ψ(x) =< si, x > +hi,
ψ(x) = max{< si, x > +hi, < sj , x > +hj >},
ψ(x) = min{< si, x > +hi, < sj , x > +hj >}.
Here si and sj are vectors in R
2, and hi and hj are
numbers. Thus, the domain of definitions of an SPLF
contains no points in small neighbourhoods of which three
or more linear functions are sewn together.
Structural matrices may be used for formal definition of
SPLFs. The structural matrix (SM) contains an infor-
mation about all linear functions, that are forming the
corresponding SPLF. Given the SM, one can easy calculate
the value of the corresponding SPLF in every point in its
domain.
Remark. If condition A3 is satisfied, the nonnegative
function σ : R2 −→ R is SPLF in domain R2 \ 0, where 0
is zero vector.
4.4 Elementary problems
The algorithm for constructing the function ϕ(·) consists,
essentially, in the sequential solution of elementary prob-
lems that arise in a certain order. These problems can be
formulated as follows.
Let
ς+(x, y) = max{< a, x > +y,< b, x > +y},
ς−(x, y) = min{< a, x > +y,< b, x > +y},
where a, b, x are vectors from R2, y ∈ R.
P r o b l e m s 1 and 2. Let some linearly independent
vectors a ∈ R2 and b ∈ R2 be given. In problem 1
[problem 2] it is required to construct the minimax solution
of problem (13), (14), (20) with σ = ς+ (with σ = ς−).
Since the function ς+ is convex, and the function ς− is
concave, one can obtain explicit formulas for solutions of
problems 1 and 2. It is not difficult to verify that the
solutions of these problems are functions
φ+(x, y) = max
l∈[a,b]
φl(x, y), φ




[a, b] = {λa+ (1− λ)b |λ ∈ [0, 1]},
φl(x, y) =< l, x > +y +H(l).
The first stage of the algorithm for constructing the
solution ϕ(·) of problem (13), (14), (23) consists in solving
problems 1 and 2. Specific problems that need to be solved
are determined by the function σ(·).
The further construction of the solution consists in solving
elementary problems of a different type.
Let s̄ = (s1, s2, s3) ∈ R3. Denote
ϕs̄(x, y) =< s, x > +s3 · y +H∗(s̄), x ∈ R2, y ∈ R
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σi(x) =< si, x >, i ∈ 1, nσ, si ∈ R2, x ∈ R2.
Denote
Z = {si|i ∈ 1, nσ}. (21)
Moreover, by virtue of representations (17), (18), without
loss of generality we can assume that the function σ(·) is
nonnegative
σ(x) ≥ 0, x ∈ R2, (22)
and consider the algorithm for constructing the function
ϕ(·), corresponding to the limit function
σ(x, y) = σ(x) + y+, x ∈ R2, y ∈ R. (23)
4.3 Simple piecewise linear functions
In Subbotin and Shagalova (1992); Shagalova (1999) the
concept of simple piecewise linear functions (SPLF) was
used. Here this concept will also be useful. The main
property of an SPLF is the following. If ψ(·) is an SPLF,
then for an arbitrary point x∗ ∈ R2 in its domain, there
is a neighbourhood Oε(x∗) where ψ(·) has one of three
possible representations:
ψ(x) =< si, x > +hi,
ψ(x) = max{< si, x > +hi, < sj , x > +hj >},
ψ(x) = min{< si, x > +hi, < sj , x > +hj >}.
Here si and sj are vectors in R
2, and hi and hj are
numbers. Thus, the domain of definitions of an SPLF
contains no points in small neighbourhoods of which three
or more linear functions are sewn together.
Structural matrices may be used for formal definition of
SPLFs. The structural matrix (SM) contains an infor-
mation about all linear functions, that are forming the
corresponding SPLF. Given the SM, one can easy calculate
the value of the corresponding SPLF in every point in its
domain.
Remark. If condition A3 is satisfied, the nonnegative
function σ : R2 −→ R is SPLF in domain R2 \ 0, where 0
is zero vector.
4.4 Elementary problems
The algorithm for constructing the function ϕ(·) consists,
essentially, in the sequential solution of elementary prob-
lems that arise in a certain order. These problems can be
formulated as follows.
Let
ς+(x, y) = max{< a, x > +y,< b, x > +y},
ς−(x, y) = min{< a, x > +y,< b, x > +y},
where a, b, x are vectors from R2, y ∈ R.
P r o b l e m s 1 and 2. Let some linearly independent
vectors a ∈ R2 and b ∈ R2 be given. In problem 1
[problem 2] it is required to construct the minimax solution
of problem (13), (14), (20) with σ = ς+ (with σ = ς−).
Since the function ς+ is convex, and the function ς− is
concave, one can obtain explicit formulas for solutions of
problems 1 and 2. It is not difficult to verify that the
solutions of these problems are functions
φ+(x, y) = max
l∈[a,b]
φl(x, y), φ




[a, b] = {λa+ (1− λ)b |λ ∈ [0, 1]},
φl(x, y) =< l, x > +y +H(l).
The first stage of the algorithm for constructing the
solution ϕ(·) of problem (13), (14), (23) consists in solving
problems 1 and 2. Specific problems that need to be solved
are determined by the function σ(·).
The further construction of the solution consists in solving
elementary problems of a different type.
Let s̄ = (s1, s2, s3) ∈ R3. Denote
ϕs̄(x, y) =< s, x > +s3 · y +H∗(s̄), x ∈ R2, y ∈ R
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where the vector s ∈ R2 is formed by the first two
components of the vector s̄, s = (s1, s2). Let us note
that if the component s3 = 1, then H
∗(s̄) = H(s) and
ϕs̄(x, y) = φs(x, y).
For given set M we denote its closure by the symbol clM
and its boundary by the symbol ∂M .
P r o b l e m s 3 and 4. Let some linearly independent
vectors ā = (a1, a2, a3) ∈ R3 and b̄ = (b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3
and a number r > 0 be given. Let
ϕ∗(x, y) = max{ϕā(x, y), ϕb̄(x, y)},
ϕ∗(x, y) = min{ϕā(x, y), ϕb̄(x, y)},
G∗ = {(x, y) ∈ R3|ϕ∗(x, y) < r},
G∗ = {(x, y) ∈ R3|ϕ∗(x, y) < r}.
In problem 3 it is required to construct a continuous
function ϕ0 : clG∗ → R which is a minimax solution of
the PDE (13) in G∗ and satisfies the relations
ϕ0(x, y) < r, ∀(x, y) ∈ G∗;ϕ0(x, y) = r, ∀(x, y) ∈ ∂G∗.
In problem 4 it is required to construct a continuous
function ϕ0 : clG∗ → R which is a minimax solution of
the PDE (13) in G∗ and satisfies the relations
ϕ0(x, y) < r, ∀(x, y) ∈ G∗;ϕ0(x, y) = r, ∀(x, y) ∈ ∂G∗.
The solution of Problem 3 is the function
ϕ0(x, y) = max
s̄
ϕs̄(x, y) for s̄ ∈ Sr(ā, b̄),
where
Sr(ā, b̄) = {s̄ ∈ con(ā, b̄)| < s,w0 > +H∗(s̄) = r},
con(ā, b̄) = {λā+ µb̄)|λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0},
and point w0 ∈ R2 is the solution of the system of two
linear equations
< a,w0 > +H
∗(ā) = r, < b, w0 > +H
∗(b̄) = r.
Components of vectors a ∈ R2 and b ∈ R2 coincide with
the first two components of ā and b̄, respectively.
The solution of Problem 4 in the cases which arise in the
construction of the solution ϕ(·) of problem (13), (14), (23)
is the function
ϕ0(x, y) = min
s̄
ϕs̄(x, y) for s̄ ∈ Sr(ā, b̄).
5. THE MAIN RESULT
Let us denote by Ω the set of points in the space R3 where
the Hamiltonian H∗ : R3 → R is nondifferentiable. Let 0
be the zero vector in R3. By the set Z ⊂ R2 (21) of vectors
forming function σ, we define the set Z ⊂ R3
Z = {s̄ = (s1, s2, s3) ∈ R3|s = (s1, s2) ∈ Z, s3 = 1}.
Now we can formulate an assertion containing the main
result of the paper.
Theorem 2. Suppose that conditions A2-A3 are satisfied.
Then
A) The solution ϕ(·) of problem (13), (14), (23) is nonneg-
ative function formed by sewing together linear functions
ϕs̄(x, y) =< s, x > +s3 · y +H∗(s̄), s̄ ∈ L,
where the set L consists of a finite number of elements,
and
Z ⊂ L, (L \ Z) ⊂ (Ω ∪ 0).
B) For every y∗ ∈ R function ϕ(x, y∗) in the region
{x ∈ R2|ϕ(x, y∗) > 0} is formed by sewing together a
finite collection of simple piecewise linear functions.
Proof. The assertion of the theorem follows from the
proposed algorithm for constructing the solution. The
function ϕ(·) is glued together from solutions of elementary
problems, so inequalities (15), (16) are satisfied. Omitting
the detailed description, we show here only that the
function ϕ(·) satisfies the limit relation (14).
Consider an arbitrary point (x∗, y∗), x∗ ∈ R2, y∗ ∈ R,
y∗ ≥ 0.
If x∗ is the zero vector, then for any α > 0 the vector
x∗
α













αϕ(0, 0) = 0 = σ(0, 0).
In the case y∗ = 0 it follows from the algorithm that there
exist a number α∗ > 0 and a vector s ∈ R2 such that for






















= y∗ = σ
(0, y∗).
Now let x∗ be a nonzero vector. If there exists a neighbor-
hood O(x∗) of the point x∗ on the plane R
2 in which the
function σ(·) is linear
σ(x) = 〈a, x〉 , x ∈ O(x∗),
then it follows from the algorithm that there exists a



























= 〈a, x∗〉+ y∗ = σ(x∗, y∗).
It remains to consider the case when the function σ(·) is
glued together from two linear functions in the neighbor-
hood O(x∗). Suppose, for definiteness, the linear functions
are glued together by the operation of the maximum
σ(x) = max {〈a, x〉 , 〈b, x〉} x ∈ O(x∗).
Then there exists a number α∗ > 0 such that for all







is in the region in which
the function ϕ coincides with the solution of the first































= max {〈a, x〉 , 〈b, x〉}+ y = σ(x∗, y∗),
which completes the verification of the fulfillment of the
limit relation (14).
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Birkhäuser, Boston.
Subbotin, A. and Shagalova, L. (1992). A piecewise linear
solution of the Cauchy problem for the Hamilton –
Jacobi equation. Ross. Akad. Nauk Doklady, 325 (5),
932–936. (in Russian; English transl., (1993). Russian
Acad. Sci. Dokl. Math., 46 (1), pp. 144-148).
Ukhobotov, V. (1991). Differential game with simple
motion. Soviet Mathematics, 35 (8), 67–70.
IFAC CAO 2018
Yekaterinburg, Russia, October 15-19, 2018
865
 Lyubov G. Shagalova  / IFAC PapersOnLine 51-32 (2018) 861–865 865
Hopf, E. (1965). Generalized solutions of nonlinear equa-
tions of first order. J. Math. Mech., 14, 951–973.
Kamneva, L. and Patsko, V. (2016). Construction of a
maximal stable bridge in games with simple motions
on the plane. Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of
Mathematics, 292, Suppl. 1, S125–S139.
Krasovskii, N. and Subbotin, A. (1974). Positional Differ-
ential Games. Nauka, Moscow. (in Russian).
Krasovskii, N. and Subbotin, A. (1988). Game-Theoretical
Control Problems. Springer-Verlag, Inc., New York.
Pachter, M. and Yavin, Y. (1986). Simple-motion pursuit-
evasion differential games, part 1: Stroboscopic strate-
gies in collision-course guidance and proportional nav-
igation. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applica-
tions, 51 (1), 95–127.
Petrosjan, L. (1993). Differential Games of Pursuit (Series
on Optimization, Vol 2). World Scientific Publishers,
Singapore.
Pshenichyi, B. and Sagaidak, M. (1970). Differential games
of prescribed duration. Kibernetika, 2, 54–63. (in
Russian; English transl., (1970). Cybernetics, 6, pp. 72-
83).
Shagalova, L. (1999). A piecewise linear minimax solution
of the Hamilton –Jacobi equation. In F. Kirillova and
V. Batukhtin (eds.), Proceedings of IFAC Conference
on Nonsmooth and Discontinuous Problems of Control
and Optimization, 193–197. Pergamon, Elsevier Science,
Oxford.
Subbotin, A. (1991). Minimax Inequalities and Hamilton
–Jacobi Equations. Nauka, Moscow. (in Russian).
Subbotin, A. (1995). Generalized Solutions of First Or-
der PDEs. The Dynamical Optimization Perspective.
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